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Abstract 
This review offers a critical reading of the November 2014 India-U.S. trade deal that 
unblocked an impasse in the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Doha round and 
considers what it means for the way we govern global trade.  It argues that the 
agreement, rather than being a ‘victory’ for the developing world or a cause for 
celebration, may simply reinforce an unfair and problematic system of distributing trade 
opportunities among WTO members.  It may also obscure further the need for a 
fundamental overhaul of the way global trade is governed. In so doing, the review speaks 
to broader debates about what happens when ‘rising’ powers replace established states in 
global institutions in the absence of wider processes of reform; and it adds to growing 
concerns about the increasing precariousness of least developed countries (LDCs) in 
international economic regimes. 
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Changing Power Relations in the WTO 
WHY THE INDIA-U.S. TRADE AGREEMENT SHOULD MAKE US WORRY MORE, RATHER 
THAN LESS, ABOUT GLOBAL TRADE GOVERNANCE 
 
Introduction 
In mid-November 2014 India and the United States reached a deal clearing the way for a 
package of trade measures agreed at the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) December 
2013 Bali ministerial conference finally to be implemented (Wilkinson, Hannah and 
Scott, 2014).  The deal—which unlocked an impasse that had arisen in July 2014 and 
which modifies the decision on Public Stockholding for Food Security Purposes to extend 
indefinitely the protection afforded to developing country agricultural stockholding 
programmes from challenges under the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism until a 
‘permanent solution’ can be negotiated—was greeted in many quarters with relief and 
welcome, and as a signal that the Doha round might actually be moving towards 
something like a conclusion (Business Standard, 2014; Mehra, 2014; Wolfgang, 2014; 
Needham, 2014; Kumar, Hughes and Miles, 2014; also Donnan, 2014; Elliott, 2014).  It 
was also seen as something of a victory for India.  The BBC’s Sanjoy Majumder (2014), 
for instance, suggested India’s actions had contributed to saving the WTO from what the 
organization’s Director General (DG) Roberto Azevêdo’s had previously suggested was 
‘the most serious situation that this organization has ever faced’ (WTO, 2014).  He also 
suggested that it had strengthened India’s role of as a ‘firm leader’ and champion of the 
global poor. 
 
What is noteworthy about much of the post-agreement commentary is that it takes the 
deal as sure evidence that positive effects will result from changes in the distribution of 
power in the multilateral trading system.  Yet, while it is certainly the case that a greater 
diffusion of power can—in the abstract—be positive for the governance of global trade, 
we celebrate India’s ‘victory’ at our peril.  While it may be the case that the India-U.S. 
agreement enables the Doha round to move forward, the history of the multilateral 
trading system tells us that such forward movement is unlikely to result in broad-based, 
equitable, development gains.  Indeed, it is more likely that the agreement will serve to 
reinforce the long-run tendency in multilateral trade negotiations to produce bargains 
that buttress and exacerbate existing inequalities in the distribution of trade and related 
economic opportunities.  What we should be doing, instead, is seeing the India-U.S. 
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agreement not as an antidote to the ills of the multilateral trading system but as 
symptomatic of much that is wrong therein and as yet another example of a small 
number of large trading powers dominating negotiations while at the same time holding 
the rest of the membership hostage to their special interests. 
 
This critical review explores why we ought to think more critically about what the India-
U.S. agreement means for the way we govern global trade and not get side-tracked by the 
collective sign of relief that occurs when something happens that appears to have broken a 
deadlock in multilateral trade negotiations.  It explores how the agreement may simply 
reinforce an existing and problematic way of distributing commercial opportunities 
among WTO members as well as what might result should movement forward in the 
Doha round take place on the basis of the agreement and the operationalisation of the 
Bali package.  In so doing, the review speaks to broader debates about what happens 
when ‘rising’ powers replace established states in governance regimes in the absence of 
wider processes of reform (Hopewell, 2014; Kahler, 2013; Scott and Wilkinson, 2013); 
and it underscores Amitendu Palit’s (2015) claims in an earlier issue of Geoforum that least 
developed countries (LDCs) are increasingly precariously placed in global economic 
regimes by casting doubt on the capacity of the multilateral trading system to offer 
shelter to the most vulnerable and least able. 
 
What the India-U.S. deal real ly  means for the way we govern trade 
The India-U.S. deal is not, as many claim, a antidote for an ailing form of trade 
governance.  Rather, it is an agreement that enables trade governance to continue in the 
same way that it always has—that is, as a system which distributes commercial 
opportunities disproportionately to the largest and most significant trading powers while 
at the same time offering little that is of comparable value to smaller, less able developing 
and least developed countries.  In this way, the India-U.S. agreement merely replicates 
the manner in which multilateral trade deals have always been done (thereby adding 
further credibility and precedent to continuing to do deals in this way); and it ensures 
that the actual substance of what the India-U.S. agreement generates, not only in terms 
of moving the Doha round forward but also within the broader context of the 
distribution of economic opportunities across the life-cycle of the multilateral trading 
system, will be asymmetrical and limited for the vast majority of WTO members.   
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What is interesting about the India-U.S. agreement is not so much that it unlocks the 
post-Bali deadlock but that the brokering of the deal happened in a way that is entirely 
consistent with the manner in which multilateral trade negotiations have always been 
conducted.  Often forgotten in analyses of the way the multilateral trading system works 
is the fact that the negotiation machinery is not a neutral, technocratic device that 
manages the flow of world trade for the gain of all involved.  It is a fundamentally 
political mechanism the character of which is determined by the interactions of its 
member states.  These interactions are not mere instances of co-ordination, collaboration 
and mutual assistance.  They are at root adversarial encounters designed to leverage trade 
advantages that are of greater benefit to domestic rather than foreign interests.  This is a 
somewhat obvious—but nonetheless important—point because it helps us see that in 
large part the WTO is a forum in which competition among member states over trade 
advantages takes place and that the outcome of that competition (that is, what has been, 
and who has ‘won’) forms the basis of the way trade is governed globally (see Wilkinson, 
2014: 45-78).  It is not, as a result, a forum intrinsically designed to promote trade co-
operation.  If it were then the primary goal would be the conclusion of deals designed to 
promote absolute and reasonably equitable gain and not to mediate in a competition 
among members to secure individualistic gain and relative advantage. 
 
Competition not co-operation 
Why does this matter?  It matters because it helps us see that a global trade regime 
governed by competition and not co-operation is unlikely to distribute welfare gains 
equitably among members; nor is it likely to make a major contribution to the 
elimination of extreme poverty precisely because it is the strongest and most powerful 
that benefit most from adversarial systems.  Pitching member states against one another 
in strategic games wherein few hard-and-fast rules exist, where myriad strategies are 
deployed in pursuit of a deal, and where the bulk of negotiating takes place away from 
the scrutiny of others, inevitably produces asymmetrical bargains.  These bargains, in 
turn, produce trade opportunities, rules governing the conduct of negotiations and 
procedures for the administration of the system that affect all aspects of the system’s 
operation but which inevitably favour the interests of the strongest and most powerful.  
 
Certainly other aspects of the system are important—such as the dispute settlement 
system, trade policy review mechanism, and the technical and support services offered by 
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the secretariat—but in themselves these are not going to drive forward the kind of trade 
opportunities the poorest and least developed need.  It thus remains the case that the 
primary means of governing global trade and of distributing commercial opportunities is 
through competitive bargaining among 160 members all of whom seek at a minimum to 
maintain—and preferably to extend—their advantages.   
 
Organising a system of trade governance in this way has two effects.  First, it ensures that 
negotiations will always be highly contested affairs and exude a propensity towards crisis 
and collapse—as the passage of the Doha round amply shows but which also has been 
evident across the multilateral trading system’s history (see Wilkinson, 2006).  Second, in 
the absence of a clear preponderance of power, an agreement between leading 
adversaries (such as India and the United States) or a capacity to bring members together 
around specific and shared issues, negotiations will tend towards stasis—as they have 
frequently in the Doha round.  
 
Bargaining among unequals 
Yet, before we are able to think about how global trade governance might be reformed, 
we need to recognise that it is not just negotiating among unequals per se that is the 
problem.  It is that the vast majority of WTO members are excluded from negotiating in 
the first place.  Member states do not just come to the negotiating table varying 
dramatically in size and negotiating capacity and ability.  Rather, negotiations are 
organised to ensure that the most significant players in world trade—as major exporters 
and/or significant importers—have a seat at the negotiating table and are able to 
influence proceedings (as the India-U.S. agreement shows), while those that matter very 
little in terms of their overall share of world trade do not. 
 
This practice is highly exclusionary.  While it was always intended that any beneficial 
outcome of these small group negotiations would be conveyed to the wider membership 
under the most-favoured nation (MFN) provisions, a least two problems present 
themselves.  First, this is a piecemeal mechanism for passing on what are often 
untailored and incongruous market openings onto smaller developing countries with 
little thought to their specific commercial make-up or economic needs.  Second, the lack 
of developing (particularly small and least developed) country involvement in setting the 
tone and content of the negotiations inhibits their capacity to negotiate areas of interest 
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to them as well as crowds out their capacity to have a say in the way trade is governed.  
This is most evidently the case in the run-up to the India-U.S. agreement when Indian 
special interests prevailed over those of the least developed and wherein the poorest and 
least able had little say in the unblocking of the impasse. 
 
The trouble with rounds 
This would be bad enough if deals like the India-U.S. agreement were merely rare 
exceptions.  Yet, deals like these are very much the norm and have comprised the 
primary way multilateral trade agreements have been brokered over time.  That said, it is 
not just the existence of large power small group deals that is problematic.  It is their 
compound consequences—that is, what results when they take place time after time.  
And it is for this reason that the use of rounds as a vehicle for negotiating market 
openings needs also to be rethought. 
 
At issue here is that rounds are not ‘blank pieces of paper’, ‘fresh starts’ or ‘year zeros’.  
Rather, each new negotiation unfolds in relation to the outcome of a previous round or 
rounds.  This means that delegations approach any new round mindful of what has gone 
before, cognisant of any inequities that resulted therein, and determined to improve upon 
any previous deal relative to the gains—perceived or otherwise—of their competitors.  It 
is precisely because of this ‘iterated’ nature that the outcome of one round necessarily 
shapes the way future negotiations unfold.  For both developed and developing countries 
this inevitably means pursuing openings in areas in which a deal was not, or was only 
partially reached during a previous round.  It also provides an opportunity to rectify 
anomalies and imbalances from previous deals.   
 
This iterated form of bargaining predictably accentuates the degree to which members 
are placed at loggerheads with one another.   For developing countries, the asymmetry of 
previous rounds has ensured that they approach any new negotiation seeking to rectify 
past anomalies (and as time goes by, more determinedly so).  While this position has also 
been the case for a number of industrial countries—as it was for the United States during 
the Kennedy round vis-à-vis the European Economic Community—their primary 
position has been one of seeking to protect sectors of decreasing competitiveness and 
political sensitivity as well as to open up new areas of economic opportunity.  The 
problem is that in approaching a new round those seeking some kind of rectification are 
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encouraged to agree to new concessions in return for remedial action.  This is the logic 
of any bargaining-based system.  Yet, it is because of this requirement to offer something 
in return for that which is received, coupled with existing power inequalities between 
participating states, that asymmetries in outcome have inevitably been perpetuated and 
exacerbated in successive trade rounds.  The Uruguay round (1986-1994) is a good 
example of just this and provides the backdrop to developing country positions in the 
Doha round.  And the Bali package promises to continue this pattern of asymmetrical 
exchange (see Wilkinson, Hannah and Scott, 2014).  
 
The point here is that the use of exchange as the mechanism of liberalising (and 
governing) trade among states of vastly different capabilities in institutional confines that 
have traditionally favoured the industrial states (and which now includes a small set of 
very large developing countries of which India is just one) over their developing 
counterparts has produced bargains that are of dramatically different value to 
participating states (that is, they are asymmetrical).  As negotiations take place in bursts 
over time, the inequities of one negotiation influences others; and, as it is only in 
reciprocating for concessions received that a round can hope to reach a conclusion, it is 
only through a process of exchange that past anomalies can be redressed.  Yet, it is 
precisely because each exchange is asymmetrical that as negotiations take place over time 
the imbalance of commercial opportunities among participating states is exacerbated 
rather than attenuated.  And while it may be the case that the least developed are often 
relieved of the requirement to contribute anything, this itself is not unproblematic 
precisely because it excludes them from influencing in any way the shape of the 
negotiations.   
 
Conclusion 
Stating that a multilateral trading system wherein successive asymmetrical outcomes are 
negotiated favouring those that already have a great deal over those that have very little 
requires reform is obvious and has been so for a very long time.  Yet, despite the 
system’s well-noted faults little agreement has been forthcoming on what reform might 
look like (see Cottier and Elsig, 2011 for a range of views).  Part of the problem is that 
many of the reform proposals that have been put forward would, if implemented, merely 
patch up an already problematic system.  Few have pressed for a more radical overhaul 
of the system that does away with competitive negotiating as a machinery for generating 
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economic opportunity, which installs a governance structure that is more democratic, 
representative, accountable and appropriate, or which connects the way we govern trade 
up with the realisation of broader social goods and the way we manage other aspects of 
global life (see Wilkinson, 2014).   
 
Yet, much like the caution with which we should approach ‘victories’ such as India’s, we 
also fail to heed the necessity of WTO reform at our peril.  As Nelson Mandela put it in 
1998 in his assessment of the previous Uruguay round at the celebrations of the 
multilateral trading system’s half century, 
 
Fifty years ago, when the founders of the GATT evoked the link between 
trade, growth and a better life, few could have foreseen such poverty, 
homelessness and unemployment as the world now knows. Few would have 
imagined that the exploitation of the world’s abundant resources and a 
prodigious growth in world trade would have seen the gap between rich and 
poor widening. And few could have anticipated the burden of debt on many 
poor nations.  
 
As we celebrate what has been achieved in shaping the world trading system, 
let us resolve to leave no stone unturned in working together to ensure that 
our shared principles are everywhere translated into reality ... let us forge a 
new partnership for development through trade (Mandela, 1998). 
 
It is to upturning every stone and forging a new partnership that we must now all turn. 
 
 
 
  
	  	   9 
Bibliography 
Business Standard, ‘India, US agree on food stockpiling, clear way for WTO deal’, 13 
November.  Available at: http://www.business-standard.com/article/printer-friendly-
version?article_id=114111300375_1  
Cottier, Thomas and Elsig, Manfred (eds.) (2011), Governing the World Trade Organization: 
past, present and beyond Doha, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
Donnan, Shawn (2014), Twitter commentary on Storify compiled by Denzil Correa 
‘World Trade Editor at Financial Times clarifies the “spin” about India-US #WTO 
deal’, 14 November.  Available at: https://storify.com/denzil_correa/the-spin-on-
the-india-us-wto-dea...twitter&utm_content=storify-
pingback&utm_campaign=&utm_source=t.co  
Elliott, Larry (2014), ‘India strikes deal with US over food, breathing new life into Doha 
trade talks’, The Guardian, 13 November.  Available at: 
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2014/nov/13/wto-food-security-us-india-
trade-talks-doha-round/print  
Hopewell, Kristen (2014), ‘Different paths to power: the rise of Brazil, India and China 
at the World Trade Organization’, Review of International Political Economy, earlyview 16 
June, DOI:10.1080/09692290.2014.927387. 
Kahler, Miles (2013), ‘Rising powers and global governance: negotiating change in a 
resilient status quo’, International Affairs, 89: 3, pp. 711-729. 
Kumar, Manoj, Hughes, Krista and Miles, Tom (2014), ‘India-U.S. deal revives WTO 
and hope of world trade reform’, Daily Mail, 13 November.  Available at: 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/reuters/article-2832544/India-announce-WTO-
breakthrough--sources.html  
Majumder, Sanjoy (2014), ‘India and US reach WTO breakthrough over food’, 13 
November.  Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-
30033130?print=true 
Mandela, Nelson (1998) ‘Speech to the 50th Anniversary celebrations of the GATT’, 19 
May.  Available at: 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min98_e/anniv_e/mandela_e.htm 
Mehra, Puja (2014), ‘India-U.S. deal paves the way for global trade pact’, The Hindu, 13 
November.  Available at: http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/us-resolve-
impasse-over-food-security-issues-at-wto/article6594065.ece  
Needham, Vicki (2014), ‘Global trade gets boost from US-India deal’, The Hill, 13 
	  	   10 
November.  Available at: http://thehill.com/policy/finance/223992-us-india-
announce-agreement-over-stalled-trade-deal  
Palit, Amitendu (2015), ‘Mega-RTAs and LDCs: Trade is not for the poor’, Geoforum, 58 
(January), pp. 23-26. 
Scott, James and Wilkinson, Rorden (2013), ‘China Threat? Evidence from the WTO’, 
Journal of World Trade, 47: 4, pp. 761-782. 
Wilkinson, Rorden (2006), The WTO: Crisis and the Governance of Global Trade, (London: 
Routledge). 
Wilkinson, Rorden (2014), What’s Wrong with the WTO and How to Fix It, (Cambridge: 
Polity). 
Wilkinson, Rorden, Hannah, Erin and Scott, James (2014), ‘The WTO in Bali: what MC9 
means for the Doha Development Agenda and why it matters’, Third World Quarterly, 
35: 6, pp. 1032-1050. 
Wolfgang, Ben (2014), ‘U.S., India end dispute on food security, clearing way for major 
trade deal’, The Washington Times, 13 November.  Available at: 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/nov/13/us-india-end-dispute-on-
food-security-clearing-way/print/  
WTO (2014), ‘Azevêdo says Bali impasse paralyzing WTO work, chairs report no 
progress in consultations’, WTO News Item, 16 October.  Available at: 
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news14_e/tnc_stat_16oct14_e.htm  
 
 
 
